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Abstract
Most crises, whether ecological, humanitarian,
economic or even social, are preceded by various
warning signals which make it possible to trigger alerts.
These alerts make it possible to prevent or limit human
and material damage if they are delivered on time and if
they allow stakeholders (decision-makers, populations,
etc.) to prepare adequately for the coming crisis.
Today, there are many systems that can pick up the
warning signals of crises to limit their consequences.
Warning systems are one of them, they have proven
their effectiveness, but as with any system involving
populations, a part of unpredictable remains. In
this article, we are interested in industrial accidents
and in particular the fire at the Lubrizol factory in
Rouen (France), classified SEVESO, in September 2019.
Following interviews with the population of the Rouen’s
agglomeration, we set an example of distrust of public
authorities’ decisions and give some leads on how an
information system could reconcile populations and
decision-makers.
1. Introduction
In 2016, the global community invested nearly
$27 billion in humanitarian assistance to help people
affected by crises (mainly in response to floods,
droughts, storms, earthquakes or epidemics) [1]. This
aid continues to increase in large part to respond to the
increase of natural disasters. In fact, more than 1,100
natural disasters were recorded in 2017 around the
world according to the Natural Disaster Observatory,
compared to only 599 in 2002. Globally, a growing
number of professionals and volunteers are trying
to help limit the consequences of crises, in terms of
number of lives lost, economic damages and people
affected [2], but these continue to grow.
In France, natural risks: floods, marine submersions
and coastal erosion, storms and cyclones, earthquakes,
ground movements, forest fires, volcanic eruptions and
avalanches, etc. and technological risks: industrial
or nuclear risks, transport of dangerous materials,
mining risks, dam failures, etc. are spread all over the
territory. Between 1982 and 2016, four fifths of French
municipalities were recognized in a state of natural
disaster at least once, representing a total of 107,700
recognitions of municipalities in a state of natural
disaster [3].
Despite the growing number of publications and
knowledge acquired on risk, the vulnerability of
populations, resilience and warning systems, crisis
management practices remain extremely delicate
subjects to think about and implement [4]. Indeed,
on the one hand, crises are considered as exceptional
events, and on the other hand, to manage a crisis, a
significant number of actors must act on red flags which
are often the result of an analysis of complex processes.
However, the greater the complexity of the processes
and the greater the number of actors and from different
cultures, the more difficult it will be to manage a crisis.
2. Crises and populations
Modern societies are increasingly fragile in the
face of crises. In global risk management, measures
to reduce this vulnerability are therefore increasingly
proposed. Here, we are interested in measures to
reduce social vulnerability, which concern in particular
the ability of populations to face risk through their
behaviour. We consider here the behaviour of
populations in reaction to an alert or a crisis as a
factor of vulnerability of societies but also as an issue
of resilience. Indeed, certain individual tendencies
or collective movements, such as panic phenomena,
individualist reactions, the spread of rumours or distrust
of the alert, can both hinder the response during a
crisis, and have strong long-term consequences. These
consequences can be diverse, psychological, political or
economic for example, and make it difficult to return to
a normal situation.






Several concepts such as the resilience of
populations or community resilience have emerged
in recent years, accompanied in France by various
initiatives such as the participation of populations in
civil security exercises, in order to reinvest populations
in crisis management.
The awareness of the challenges of resilience by
French stakeholders has also resulted in concrete
operational measures. These were notably initiated
following the promulgation of the law of 13 August
2004 on the modernization of civil security. Indeed,
this law encourages actions aimed at making the
citizen responsible, going against the paradigm of
“all protection” by the State, which in France has
historically led to the idea that it was possible to
protect, in absolute terms, the population. The ORSEC
plan1 now revolves around a common and simplified
crisis management organization, accompanied by a risk
inventory. Thus, efforts have been made in terms
of institutional communication, through a redesign of
the warning system in particular, by the integration
of digital tools, and through increasingly diversified
communications on institutional sites, but also on social
networks more recently. It should be noted that
for a long time, the foundations of the crises cause
controversies/polemics, for many, still topical [5] and
recurring criticisms exist on the vulnerability of the
territories and the search for responsible people to whom
to do pay for the occurrence/consequences of disasters.
2.2. Alert
Before the second world war, the means to alert the
populations vis-a-vis a major risk was the tocsin. It was
then gradually replaced by sirens which, since 1948,
have constituted the National Alarm Network (RNA).
Unfortunately, the sirens are partly obsolete, do not
cover the whole territory, do not make it possible to
inform the populations and are not synchronized with all
the other means of alert [6]. Note, however, that other
means of alert, which are evolving with the development
of communication tools, complete this network, such
as automatic calling machines or sending emails, which
allow, at a more local level, to alert the populations.
A warning system can only work effectively if
the people receiving the alerts are able to respond
appropriately [7]. The alerts must be delivered on time
and reach the populations concerned, but they must
also be able to be understood, accepted and triggered
safeguarding behaviour.
1Organization of Civil Security Response
2.3. Risk typologies
Crises can be classified according to different
typologies, depending on the nature of the risks to
which they relate or according to the event to which
they are associated. The information service of the
French government2 proposes to classify the major
risks in the following categories: terrorist threat,
health risks, technological risks (industrial, nuclear,
biological accident, etc.), natural risks (landslide, fire,
flood, hurricane, earthquake, etc.), and cyber risks.
Another typology is proposed by the State [8] which
differentiates fixed (nuclear, industrial, large dams,
etc.) and non-fixed technological risks (land, air,
water pollution, etc.), rail, motorway, aeronautical,
river, maritime (land interface), natural and health
risks. Finally, the classification of the Institute
for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN)3
recognizes, for its part, four main risk groups, according
to the perceptions of the French (relating to the
perceived importance of the risk, trust in the French
authorities and the perceived veracity of the information
received) [9]: individual risks (e.g. smoking and
obesity among young people, drugs, etc.), risks relating
to diffuse pollution (e.g. air or water pollution, soil
pollution, etc.), non-industrial collective risks (e.g.
domestic accidents, heat waves, etc.) and technological
risks attached to identifiable sites and actions (e.g. food
products, chemical installations, etc.).
In this article, we are particularly interested in
industrial risks.
3. Crisis management in France
The organization of crisis management in France is
based on the principle of subsidiarity, it is based on
the municipal, departmental and national levels. The
decision to trigger the alert falls within the exercise of a
general administrative police power, in accordance with
the legal and regulatory provisions in force. The alert is
part of a set of measures to protect populations, closely
linked to crisis management. During a rescue operation,
alerting is one of the responsibilities associated with
the direction of rescue operations (DOS). It is, except
in exceptional cases, exercised by the Mayor within
the framework of his powers of general administrative
police or by the Prefect4. The mayor is the common law
authority responsible for making the decision to trigger
the alert, in accordance with article L.2212-2-2 of the
General Code of Local Authorities. The jurisprudence
2www.gouvernement.fr/en
3www.irsn.fr/EN
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative divisions of France
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of the Council of State specifies the field of intervention
of the mayor by establishing that it falls to the mayor,
under his powers of general police, to prepare the crisis
situations likely to arise on the territory of his commune,
and in particular to implement the alert and information
measures for the populations (decision of the Council
of State of June 22, 1987). The municipal backup plan
sets the organization necessary for the dissemination
of the alert and safety instructions. The prefect of
department also has competence in the matter which
intervenes in certain cases (danger on the territory of
several communes within the same department, failure
of the mayor, event which exceeds the capacities of
the commune, event of vast scope that justifies him to
take the lead in relief operations). When the prefect is
at the origin of the triggering of the alert, the mayor
can be brought to supplement its diffusion by all the
means at his disposal (megaphones, panels with variable
message, diffusion of e-mails, etc). Finally, at national
level, the Prime Minister (Title III of the Constitution),
the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior
(Articles L.1142-1 and L.1142-2 of the Defence Code),
have the possibility of deciding on the triggering of
alert measures. In all consistency, these interventions
are generally limited to particularly serious situations
concerning a large geographic area. In any event,
whatever the authority vested with the power to decide
on the alert, the latter is free to choose the vectors of
dissemination of this alert. The obligation attached to
this mission is an obligation of result, not to resort to
particular means.
3.1. Decision in crisis management
The urgency of a crisis situation means that the
decisions taken to deal with it must be swift and
effective. To respond to this, crisis units are set up to
bring together the relevant stakeholders. Within a crisis
unit, decisions are conditioned by strong uncertainties, a
high number of stakeholders, sometimes extremely short
periods of time to implement actions, communication
problems, and important issues far exceeding the only
immediate operational aspects [10]. The decisions
mainly concern the choice of actions to be carried out
and the resources to be allocated to these actions. They
are regularly reassessed according to the evolution of
the situation, by a new cycle of questions. An isolated
individual is of course not legitimate to make such
decisions, even if his experience and skills are proven.
Decisions are taken collectively, by a multiplicity of
stakeholders. Although in the event of a crisis there is a
single manager designated as the commander of rescue
operations (COS), he must interact with interlocutors
from different professional cultures, not always present
in the same place. According to [11], this multiplicity of
stakeholders almost automatically leads to an increase
in the possibility of disagreements and delays, and
in differences in the hierarchy of priorities. [4] also
highlights this difficulty by evoking the growing role
that the media play today thanks to the speed with
which they have access to information. Their new
status as full-fledged actors in the management of the
crisis represents a test that can be “destabilizing” for
decision-makers. Finally, decisions are not always
consensus.
3.2. SEVESO Companies
Since 1982, the SEVESO directive5 requires States
and businesses to identify the risks associated with
dangerous industrial activities and to take the necessary
measures. The industries classified as SEVESO sites are
establishments whose quantity of dangerous products
exceeds the thresholds set in the European SEVESO
directive. Over the years, the framework of the directive
has evolved and, in June 2015, it was the SEVESO III
directive (directive 2012/18/EU of July 4, 2012) which
entered into force. All sites, industrial or agricultural,
potentially presenting a risk of causing pollution or
nuisance, in particular for the surrounding populations,
are qualified as Classified Installations for the Protection
of the Environment (ICPE). SEVESO classified sites
are among the ICPEs whose operation is subject to
authorization by the prefect. A distinction is made
between so-called “high threshold” installations which
present a major risk and so-called “low threshold”
installations for which the risk is classified as significant.
The prefect is the public authority in charge of the
police of SEVESO classified installations. He gives,
among others, the authorizations for operation and the
operating conditions. Moreover, these installations are
inspected and controlled by state agents of the Regional
Directorates for the Environment, Development and
Housing (DREAL6) throughout their existence to verify
that safety conditions are met.
Among the new features of the SEVESO III
directive, we can cite the strengthening of the provisions
relating to public access to useful information in
terms of security. Residents living near SEVESO
installations must therefore have direct access, via
Internet, to information, prevention programs and
emergency measures. In addition, SEVESO III requires
all SEVESO companies at high risk of accident to





4. The Lubrizol factory
In this article, we are interested in a particular
SEVESO installation: the Lubrizol factory in Rouen7
(France) which recently faced a major fire.
4.1. Presentation
Since 1954, Lubrizol France8, whose head office
is based in Rouen, has been developing its activity
of manufacturing and selling additives for lubricants.
With its three production sites based in Rouen, Le
Havre and Mourenx9, Lubrizol France is the main
foreign subsidiary of the Lubrizol Corporation Group
and the leading exporter from Haute-Normandie10.
The company is certified Quality, Environment and
Health/Safety. The Rouen industrial site also hosts a
large part of the European support services (Supply
Chain Europe, purchasing, finance and IT), as well
as Lubrizol Holdings France and the headquarters
of Lubrizol Advanced Material France. Lubrizol is
committed to following the “Responsible Care global
charter” to ensure and continuously improve the safety
of its environment, people and facilities. The Lubrizol
factory in Rouen is located on 14 hectares of an
industrial-port area, south-west of Rouen, mainly in the
city of Rouen, but also in Le Petit-Quevilly11 [12]. The
Rouen site has been subject to the European SEVESO
“high threshold” directive since 2009. Three types of
risk have been identified: (i) fire, due to the flammable
nature of the products stored; (ii) toxic dispersion, due
to the thermal decomposition of certain products, the
combustion of a liquid layer, or the spillage of toxic
products; (iii) explosion, due to the formation and
ignition of flammable vapors, triggering a deflagration.
For public information, Lubrizol is attached to a
site monitoring commission (Decree of February 7,
2012), composed of representatives of the State, local
authorities, manufacturers, environmental protection
associations, residents and employees [13]. There is
also the Departmental File of Major Risks (DDRM) and
the Municipal Information Document on Major Risks
(DICRIM) in order to inform citizens preventively about
the risks. The Particular Zone Intervention Plan (PPI)
presents the risks of the 20 companies concerned by the
PPI of the Rouen West zone [14].
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rouen
8https://france.lubrizol.com/en/
9Rouen and Le Havre are cities in the North West of France
(Normandy) and Mourenx is in the South West.
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper Normandy
11Le Petit-Quevilly is located in Normandy in the Seine-Maritime
department. Bordering on Rouen (and the Lubrizol factory), it
is the 7th town in the department with 22,089 inhabitants. The
town is located on the left bank of a meander of the Seine river.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le Petit-Quevilly
4.2. Background
The Lubrizol factory in Rouen has experienced
various crises.
• 1974 and 1989: Significant leak of Mercaptan
(little known at the time by the general public)12.
In 1974 and 1989, residents have to leave their
homes, information is lacking and risks are
unknown, the SEVESO directive does not yet
exist.
• 2013 : Large Mercaptan leak. An unpleasant
odour is perceived as far as the Paris region and
in the south of England. The odour was perceived
at extremely low concentrations, far below the
regulatory toxicity threshold, there was no danger
to health, but lack of clear information from the
public, the incident caused panic13,14. A specific
intervention plan is triggered (preventively). It
allowed the authorities to supervise the removal
of the product and the cleaning of the tanks
[15]. The company is taking corrective action.
The State is also reacting: Minister Delphine
Batho announced, in April 2013, about twenty
reinforced security measures for SEVESO sites,
as part of a mobilization plan for the prevention
of technological risks. One of these measures
is the creation of a rapid intervention force that
can quickly mobilize experts and resources from
other industrial sites, and call on independent
laboratories and associations to quickly measure
the level of accidental releases15 [16, 17]. Legal
and ministerial investigations are carried out and
Lubrizol sanctioned16.
• 2015: Following an operational incident, 2,000
liters of mineral oil are discharged into the
rainwater drainage system. A dam is put in place
to avoid any diffusion in the Seine river.
• 2017: A prefectural decree for formal notice for
insufficiency of the fire-fighting system is taken
concerning the factory17.
12Methanethiol, or methylmercaptan, is an organosulfur
compound. It is a foul-smelling colourless gas (whose smell is
reminiscent of rotten cabbage). It is a natural substance that can be
found in the blood, brain and other tissues, animal or human.
13Agnès Rousseaux and Ivan du Roy, Toxic gas in Rouen:
have the authorities been lax?, January 22, 2013, (French)
https://www.bastamag.net/Gaz-toxique-a-Rouen-les-autorites
14Lubrizol affair: the overwhelming report, July 18, 2013, (French)
https://www.francebleu.fr/affaire-lubrizol-le-rapport-accablant-1374155004
15Laurent Radisson, Industrial risks: the three
measures of the Batho plan, April 11, 2013, (French)
https://www.actu-environnement.com/ae/news/risques-industriels-PPRT-force-intervention-
rapide-Seveso-18261.php4
16Lubrizol factory in Rouen: already in 2013, a
gas leak and sanctions, September 26, 2019, (French)
https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/incendie/incendie-d-un-site-seveso-a-rouen/usine-
lubrizol-de-rouen-en-2013-deja-une-fuite-de-gaz-et-des-sanctions 3632785.html
17Fire at the Lubrizol factory, September 26, 2019, (French)
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It should be noted that, although some incidents can
happen, when they are repeated and sanctioned, this is
worrying (especially from population’s point of view).
5. September 26, 2019 fire
A fire broke out on September 26, 2019 in the
Lubrizol factory18. As a result, a thick plume of
black smoke formed, reaching more than 20 km.
The first day is devoted to controlling the fire and
implementing measures to protect the population and
the environment. The authorities, who communicate,
want to be reassuring in view of the first measurements
carried out. However, public fears both in terms of
health and environment are growing and public speaking
is difficult to hear. The publication, on October 1,
2019, of the list of products on site does not help
reassure the public to such an extent that before the
end of the first week following the event, the court of
Rouen is seized of several complaints, a parliamentary
information mission is created, the dissatisfaction of
several impacted professions is expressed in various
ways.
Fire started
A fire broke out on Thursday, September 26, 2019 at
around 3:40 a.m. within the Lubrizol factory hitting the
barrel crushing and storage facilities as well as a nearby
warehouse belonging to the company SCMT (Shopping
and transport company)19. The formal origin of the fire
has not been established. In a press release the official
website of the industrial group hypothesizes that it may
be external to the site20
Crisis unit
The prefect of Seine-Maritime immediately triggers the
Particular Zone Intervention Plan (PPI) and opens a
departmental operational centre (COD) in the prefecture
to manage the event. A Public Information Centre (CIP)
is also installed in the prefecture, with a free telephone
number. At 3 p.m., the CIP had recorded more than
1,200 calls21. At the same time, the municipalities
concerned, once informed, also initiate their PPI and
respectively set up a crisis unit. For the commune of
Le Petit-Quevilly, the chronology is as follows22:
https://www.alternative76.fr/2019/09/26/incendie-de-l-usine-lubrizol-contexte-bilan-et-
t%C3%A9moigages/
18https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronologie de l%27incendie de
l%27usine Lubrizol %C3%A0 Rouen and de ses cons%C3%
A9quences, (French)
19Fire at Lubrizol Rouen, France,
https://www.lubrizol.com/Rouen/Company-Statements
20Fire in Rouen: the Lubrizol company is filing a complaint
for involuntary destruction, September 30, 2019, Le Monde, (French)
https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2019/09/30/rouen-lubrizol-porte-plainte-pour-
destruction-involontaire-par-explosion-ou-incendie 6013671 3244.html
21Fire at the Seveso de Lubrizol site in Rouen: relive the
day minute by minute, September 26, 2019, Ouest France, (French)
https://www.ouest-france.fr/normandie/rouen-76000/rouen-explosions-et-gigantesque-incendie-
depuis-3-h-du-matin-sur-le-site-classe-seveso-de-lubrizol-6537195
22Sébastien Bailly, Factory fire Lubrizol: the anger of the
• 4:15 a.m.: National Police telephone call to the
on-call manager of the city, informing of the
accident (having started around 3:40 a.m.) and
requesting the installation of a security barrier of
the perimeter concerned, the manager informs the
Director General of the factory, which informs
the mayor of Petit-Quevilly, and the head of the
security service.
• 4:45 a.m.: the on-call manager of the city is in
front of the burning factory.
• 5:00 a.m.: residents closest to the site are confined
to their homes by the police and fire-fighters.
• 6:00 a.m.: a crisis unit is in place at the town hall.
Population alert
At 6:11 a.m., the city of Petit-Quevilly uses its SMS and
voice call alert system to which residents who wish to
subscribe (6,770 households23). Some residents close to
the factory got scared from 5:15 a.m. - 5:30 a.m. At 7:10
a.m., the Seine-Maritime prefecture announces that it
will set off the sirens at 7:45 a.m. to alert the population.
At 8 a.m., the siren sounds in the Rouen metropolitan
area. It seems that not everyone has heard these sirens24.
The commune/town hall of Le Petit-Quevilly relays via
Tweeter at 7:30 a.m. the information of confinement
of the population within a radius of 500 m around the
site and closure of schools. At 7:37 a.m., the City
of Rouen puts out a press release on its website. At
9:30 a.m., an information number is distributed by the
Seine-Maritime prefecture. Around 10 a.m., the prefect
of Seine-Maritime tries to reassure by indicating that
there is no toxicity and that precautionary measures have
been taken.
First measures to protect people and the environment
Between the triggering of the PPI and the measures
requested by the prefecture, we can cite25,26:
• Shut-down of site activities, requiring the
shut-down of site activities and its security and
requiring the operator to secure its site (collect
and evacuate polluted water following the fire,
evacuate waste) and ensure the necessary actions
mayor of Petit-Quevilly, September 28, 2019, Ouest France, (French)
https://www.ouest-france.fr/normandie/rouen-76000/incendie-de-l-usine-lubrizol-la-colere-
de-la-maire-de-petit-quevilly-6541107
23Cédralis, alert system by telephone, (French)
http://www.petit-quevilly.fr/mairie/actualites/cedralis-systeme-d-alerte-par-telephone-710.htm
24Valentin Ehkirch, What protocols for people living
near a Seveso site?, September 29, 2019, L’Express, (French)
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/quelles-mesures-pour-proteger-les-populations-situees-
autour-d-un-site-seveso 2100349.html
25Fire at the Lubrizol factory - Chronology of
events, September 26, 2019, Le Parisien, (French)
https://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/direct-rouen-12-communes-confinees-apres-des-
explosions-et-un-incendie-dans-une-usine-chimique-26-09-2019-8160069.php
26Claire Grenier, The fire of a factory in Rouen
revives the debate on the fight against industrial




guaranteeing the absence of intrusion on site and
controlling access.
• Installation of a security barrier to protect the
defined containment perimeter of 500 m and
traffic restrictions accordingly.
• Dissemination of advice to the population.
• Closure of schools, nurseries, etc. on September
26 and 27.
• Recommendations to breeders and farmers.
• Triggering of the Polmar plan, a device triggered
in the event of accidental maritime pollution,
which notably provides for the installation of
anti-pollution dams.
6. Population interviews
Following this fire, we interviewed the population of
the Rouen agglomeration using a questionnaire (adapted
from [18]). The objective of this study was to obtain,
among other things, information on the reactions of
people to the warning signals triggered during the fire
at the Lubrizol factory on September 26, 2019. The
77 (“open” and “closed”) questions in this survey were
voluntarily very open to let people express themselves
freely, allow them to reflect on their reactions. The
study was therefore carried out from an anonymous
survey posted online from 06 December 2019 to 06
January 2020. It was created using Google Form27
for the creation of online forms and distributed via
the Facebook social network. The Facebook group
“Collectif Lubrizol” was chosen as a relay for the
dissemination of the survey. Founded in the day after
the fire started, the group had almost 25,500 members in
April 2020. Although no sociological survey has been
conducted on this interest group, we have observed a
great diversity of profiles.
It should be noted that more and more researchers
are turning to online survey methods to collect data.
The concept of online survey is generally opposed to
more conventional/traditional methods of polling by
mail, telephone or face-to-face. However, there is
no universal definition of what constitutes an online
survey. [19] uses this term to designate surveys where
respondents are not only recruited via Internet but must
also complete an online questionnaire. [20], for its part,
include any survey method involving Internet during the
dissemination, sampling or design of the survey. Finally,
sometimes the conceptual framework can be ambiguous,
as in the case of [21] who defines an online survey as a
survey carried out via a website.
Like traditional surveys, online surveys must recruit
participants. There are two modes of recruitment:
27https://www.google.fr/intl/en/forms/about/
(i) probabilistic, where participants are chosen and
targeted so that the results are generalizable to a wider
population of interest and (ii) non-probabilistic, where
the probability that a individual from a population
of interest belonging to the sample is unknown [19].
In the case of a probabilistic online survey, it is
possible to control the sampling by only distributing
the questionnaire to a closed list of email addresses, or
by recruiting participants by more traditional methods
(phone, face-to-face, etc.) and by providing them
with Internet access if necessary to respond to the
questionnaire [19, 21]. Conversely, during an online
survey with non-probabilistic recruitment, the sampling
is not controlled (e.g. invitations to the survey
posted on platforms and then relayed via social
networks without supervision, etc.). [22] names the
latter, which corresponds to our own survey method,
“unrestricted self-selection survey”. According to [19],
the corresponding sampling method is known as “river
sampling”.
The use of online survey with non-probabilistic
recruitment has many advantages (e.g. decorrelation of
survey costs from sample size, reduction of collection
times and geographic constraint, etc.) [21] but
also disadvantages (e.g. coverage error linked to
the digital divide and self-selection of respondents).
Many studies, including [23], show that regular users
of social networks are hardly representative of the
national population. Thus, the use of social media
as a dissemination platform can considerably bias
the representativeness of a sample of respondents.
However, traditional survey methods also come up
against problems of coverage and exclusion (e.g. quality
of the telephone network, etc.). In all cases, generalizing
to a larger population the results of studies obtained
from a sample of non-probabilistic respondents requires
a precise understanding of the socio-demographic
differentiation operated by these different coverage
filters. However, in the case of online survey methods
using river sampling, these sources seem to be still
poorly understood, making the results difficult to
generalize and vulnerable to possible misappropriation
[19]. To the bias induced by the exclusion of less
connected individuals is added the self-selection bias
originating from a non-probabilistic recruitment mode.
One speaks of self-selection when respondents choose
to participate in a survey themselves. It is therefore
a frequent occurrence in the survey world, which
is not limited to the case of online surveys. The
research carried out on this subject present certain
points of consensus: the self-selected respondents are
more interested in the subject treated than the rest of
the population, feel more concerned, and are more
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likely to have strong opinions concerning the themes
of the survey [20, 24]. Unfortunately, if these trends
are commonly identified, many authors note that it is
difficult to correct the biases induced by uncontrolled
voluntary participation [22, 24].
It should be noted that the biases identified in our survey
do not impact the quality/validity of the results but give
some characteristics of the respondents: people involved
who use social media - which is not generalizable.
As part of our online survey with non-probabilistic
recruitment, we collected information on the age,
sex, professional category and place of residence of
the participants, who then answered various questions
relating to the information received, the actions carried
out, the perception of the alerts, the feelings towards
the fire, past experiences and their vision of crisis
management by public policies.
7. Analysis
A total of 237 people responded to the online survey.
About 56% of the respondents are between 25 and 50
years old, 39% are over 50 years old and only 5% are
less than 25 years old. This low participation of those
under 25 may seem unusual since the questionnaire was
disseminated via a social network, but perhaps we can
partly explain it by the fact that the questionnaire was
accessible during a school holiday period (Christmas).
The rest of the population is fairly well represented.
This distribution is shown in Figure 1. Furthermore, as
shown in Figure 1, among the 237 people questioned,
93 live in Rouen and 119 live less than 15 km around
Rouen. It should also be noted that the people living in
the fire area were not the only ones to have answered
the questionnaire. This shows a real involvement of the
populations (impacted or not). Finally, Figure 1 shows
that women represent more than 70% of the respondents.
We are focusing here on an open question that
was asked at the end of the questionnaire: “In your
opinion, what could have been done differently?”. We
have analysed the answers to this question (which
constitute our dataset) syntactically, using the free
software IRaMuTeQ28. Figure 2 gives some descriptive
statistics relating to our dataset. Among the 237
respondents to the questionnaire, only 158 answered the
question studied here and there are 1183 different terms.
A first analysis of the terms used, represented via
the tag cloud29 of Figure 3, reveals that the respondents
used the terms disaster, security, population, risk, odour,
state which show their main concerns about the security
28R interface for Multidimensional Text and Questionnaire
Analysis. http://www.iramuteq.org/
29In a tag cloud, the more a word is visible, the more it is recurrent
in the text/document.
and risk of the populations but also about the implication
of the State. Other terms like life, management,
health, public, fire-fighter, trust, authority, accident,
information, dangerous, shameful testify to the diversity
of the subjects covered but also to a certain fear/anger.
The analysis of the keywords by gender of the
respondents30 showed that, whatever the gender, no
keyword is used more than another. Regarding the age
of the respondents, the most frequent keywords by age
group are:
• Under 25: management, victim, population,
accident, dangerous, inform which testify to the
awareness of the risk for the populations but also
to the need for information.
• Between 25 and 30 years old: default, smell,
pollute, politics which testify to an observation of
their daily experience (the odours of Mercaptan
are strong and slow to fade) and a negative
judgement of public decisions.
• Between 30 and 40 years old: shameful,
consequence, worry, feeling, health, future,
risk, responsible who also testify to a negative
judgement of public decisions but in addition to
the search for responsible of the fire.
• Between 40 and 50 and Over 60: confidence,
crisis, danger, alert, child, security, anger which
testify to anger and a loss of confidence in the
public authorities.
• Between 50 and 60 years old: authority,
lie, fire-fighter, fire, pollution, cancer,
communication which also testify to a loss
of confidence in the public authorities but also to
a need for communication.
These analyses reveal that the respondents, as
population for the majority directly impacted by this
disaster, suffer from annoyances (odour) but are aware
that there are risks and a need for security and that the
State is a stakeholder in the management of the crisis.
Respondents seem worried about their health and reveal
a certain dissatisfaction with the public authorities (lack
of trust, dangerous, shameful).
Some of these interpretations are also found in
Figure 4 which presents the detection of communities
in the keyword graph. Seven communities appear:
1. Population: With keywords representative of the
concerns of the population, such as smell, child,
health, confidence, etc.;
2. Disaster/Fire: With keywords like shameful, etc.
which imply that this fire should not have
happened;
30For the sake of space, all the graphics produced are not exposed
in the article.
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Figure 1. Distribution of respondents
Figure 2. Descriptive statistics
Figure 3. Tag cloud (security, population, disaster, risk, State,
odour, health, fire-fighters, etc.)
3. Factory: Where keywords like risk,
communication, information, anger,
dangerous, etc. suggest that the
respondents would have liked more
communication/information on the
dangerousness of the factory in particular;
4. City: Keywords like pollution, cancer, air, etc.
indicate that respondents are concerned about the
impact of the fire on the city and its surroundings;
5. Security/Business: Respondents incriminate
the public authorities with keywords such as
prefecture, default, measures, etc.;
6. Crisis management: The question is still topical
with regard to the aftermath of the fire,
particularly with the reopening (possibly partial)
of the Lubrizol factory (reopening, prefect, etc.);
7. Site: Keywords like citizen, fire-fighters,
housing, etc. indicate that the respondents are
concerned about the impact of the fire around
the factory and how the emergency services
responded.
The results of this study are of course specific to
the environment of the Lubrizol factory in Rouen.
It appears that depending on the age and place of
residence, in particular, the expectations/feelings of the
respondents are different. It will therefore be difficult to
provide a single homogeneous response to all. However,
we observe that they provide first elements to realize
the lack of confidence and mistrust of the populations
towards the decisions of the public authorities during a
crisis. Indeed, in light of the analysis of the responses
to the question “What do you think could have been
done differently?” during the fire at the Lubrizol factory
in Rouen on September 26, 2019, it was fairly clear
that the respondents criticized the decisions/actions
of the public authorities in managing the crisis. This
results in a lack of confidence and anger towards
decision-makers. This distrust hinders resilience31 in
the area affected by the crisis. It should be noted that
this distrust was not noted only during this fire and that
it is the subject of many discussions [25, 26] and of the
political confidence barometer [27].
8. How to reconcile populations and
decision-makers?
The mistrust of populations towards public policies
can be explained by the fact that: (i) citizens are more
and more qualified and therefore more and more capable
of taking an interest in debates and giving their opinion,
31Here, this is community/collective resilience which is the
capacity of a community to continue to live, function, develop and
flourish after a trauma or disaster.
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Figure 4. Detecting communities in the keyword graph (blue: population, odour, health, etc.; yellow: disaster, fire, etc.; pink: State,
fire-fighter, etc.; violet: factory, risk, etc.; light green: crisis, prefect, reopening, etc.; green: city, pollution, etc.; red: company, security, etc.)
(ii) numerous scandals have tarnished the confidence of
populations (contaminated blood, Chernobyl, etc.), (iii)
France’s growth is slowing down, which raises doubts
about the effectiveness of public authorities’decisions,
(iv) digital and social networks weaken the credibility of
experts (political, scientific, etc.) [26]. Finally, it is not
a question of gaining the confidence of the populations
but rather to do with distrust and to incorporate it into
the (information) system for more openness, relevance
and robustness.
We list a few other ways to try to reconcile the people
and decision-makers:
• Ability to answer questions from populations.
• Transparency of the decision-making process,
itself linked to:
– Explainability of the decision process, i.e.
the ability to explain how the system works.
This explainability must not be the subject
of an a posteriori attempt but be taken into
account during the system design phase in
order to guarantee better understanding;
– Responsibility, decision-makers must be
able to justify the choices made.
• Reconciliation of cultures: “popular” cultures,
public speaking and scientific culture.
Today there are many (information) systems
allowing decision-makers to make decisions
(decision-making aid, decision-making systems
(recommendations, etc.), etc.) increasingly user-centric.
However, Big Data, Machine Learning and Artificial
Intelligence allow “automatic” decision-making, but
such objective approaches risk leaving no room for
debate. It seems that, in addition to the decision taken,
the populations expect in particular more transparency
and therefore explanations as to the decisions taken.
Many (computer) systems today are capable of helping
decision-making, faster and faster and more and more
“efficiently” (neural networks, etc.) unfortunately,
many of these systems suffer from transparency, i.e.
of accountability and explainability, which would
reconcile decision-makers and populations. It is also
important to note that all these systems need a lot of
data to be effective, and, fortunately, disasters are not
too frequent (especially in the same place for the same
hazard, thanks to the experience acquired in particular).
Thus, the data available is therefore not sufficient for
these systems/tools to be effective. In addition, in fine,
the decision remains “human”.
9. Conclusion
In this article, we are interested in crisis
management and, in particular, in the distrust that
people may have towards public authorities and
their decisions. Following the fire at the Lubrizol
factory, classified SEVESO, in Rouen (France), on
September 26, 2019 (industrial accident), we were
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able to interview the population through an online
questionnaire. The analysis of a specific question in this
questionnaire relating to the decisions taken to manage
this crisis made it possible to highlight the distrust
of the population towards public decision-makers.
Finally, we have proposed ways to improve existing
decision-making support systems and try to identify the
characteristics that an (information) system should have
in order to reconcile populations and decision-makers
(transparency, explainability, etc.).
Among the 77 questions of our survey, we have analysed
here only one of them. The results obtained are a first
step towards reconciliation between the populations and
the decision-makers. A complete analysis will allow us
to make some implications and recommendations (for
example, regarding the actions of decision-makers or
community engagement).
Many lines of research are possible on the basis
of our reflection, in particular, as to the expected
characteristics of an information (and knowledge)
system. This work should be transverse to the scientific
community involving, among others, data processing
concepts, knowledge management, gender, culture,
public policy analysis, etc. Finally, further discussion
should also be conducted on the information to be
disseminated and the means to do so, depending on the
target population or the information to be transmitted.
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générale de la sécurité civile et de la gestion des crises,”
2006.
[9] BVA, “Irsn barometer 2019 - the perception of risks and
security in france.” http://barometre.irsn.fr, 2019.
[10] P. Lagadec, Cellules de crise: Les conditions d’une
conduite efficace. Direction générale, Les Editions
d’organisation, 1995.
[11] J. Pressman and A. Wildavsky, Implementation: How
Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in
Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs
Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic
Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic
Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation.
Oakland Project series, University of California Press,
1984.
[12] J. Fontaine and B. Mignot, “Rapport du commissaire
enquêteur sur le plan de prévention des risques
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